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INTRODUCTION 
This study is interested in the changing structure of European integration. First it attempts to 
briefly outline the past and recent trends and challenges of EU governance and on the basis of 
those developments offers some scenarios that can be expected in the near future. In the light of 
the governance trends and potential scenarios it finally formulates some modest 
recommendations for the high-level policy-makers of the Visegrad countries. The aim of those 
recommendations is to contribute to an eventual joint position of the four countries while 
shaping the future of the European Union.  
EU GOVERNANCE: PAST AND RECENT TRENDS AND CHALLENGES 
Governance issues have been on the agenda of European integration from the outset. In 1949, 
when the Council of Europe was founded, the battle between the federalists and the 
intergovernmentalists ended with the victory of the latter group. Two years later, when the 
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty was signed, the dilemma was circumvented again: 
not a top-down federation but a special kind of supranational integration was launched. This 
however was meant to lead in the longer run to a kind of a bottom-up European federation. Ever 
since the 1950s (with the birth of all three founding Treaties) we usually speak about a sui 
generis Community or now Union. This means a special alliance of states where an increasing 
part of national sovereignty is being transferred to the supranational level where it is pooled and 
exercised in common via the institutions. This sui generis system has been characterised by an 
important evolution of the institutional balance among the European Commission, the Council 
and the European Parliament, accompanied by an equally spectacular evolution of Community 
law ever since the 1964 Costa/ENEL case introducing the primacy of EC (now EU) law. In the 
integration process, the Maastricht Treaty represented a quantum leap as the EC/EU became 
responsible, in one way or another, for many areas well beyond market integration and 
resembling the responsibilities of a federal state. These ambitious changes (i.e. economic and 
monetary union, internal security issues, foreign policy, etc.) however have not been 
accompanied by a thorough institutional reform resembling a kind of a federal state.  
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Thus since the first half of the 1990s, as a response to the deepening launched by the 
Maastricht Treaty and also with a view to the upcoming historical enlargement, this challenge 
has been addressed by European leaders who proposed different solutions to it. One of the best 
known ideas was the Schäuble-Lahmers initiative in 1994 about the future structure of 
European integration. In this paper
1
 the authors – as representatives of the German Christian 
Democratic party alliance (CDU/CSU) – argued for the establishment of a so-called hard core, 
composed of those introducing the single currency, which would have a pulling effect on the 
other member states temporarily outside of it. At the same time, the initiative also emphasised 
the importance of subsidiarity including an eventual repatriation of competences from European 
to national levels. Another important milestone in the common thinking about the future of the 
EU was the model presented by then foreign minister of Germany, Joschka Fischer in 2000, in a 
speech at the Humboldt University.
2
 This concept urged the willing and able member states to 
re-establish the EU on a federal basis with new structures. This “centre of gravity” would be 
open to the rest of the member countries.  
This proposal paralleled with Jacques Delors’ concept on a federation of nation states. In his 
various speeches/interviews in the 1990s, Mr. Delors referred to federalism as a method of 
organising competences between the EU and the member states and not as an attempt to build 
up the United States of Europe. “A federal structure is the only kind of structure that could 
boost our clout with the rest of the world, yet without weakening either the nation state or 
member countries’ domestic democracy. It clearly sets out who is responsible for doing what.”3 
Delors also recognised the importance of differentiation within an ever widening Union.  
It has to be admitted that in 2013 most of those ideas are still relevant, as there are indeed 
tendencies towards the formation of a hard core along the single currency (with a kind of 
parallel structures between the ins and outs) while the issue of subsidiarity is also being 
recurrently emphasised in the debate about the future of the EU. To what extent will these 
developments lead to a federative structure for the eurozone or in the longer run for the whole 
Union, remains to be seen.  
It seems logical that most of the proposed EU models originated in Germany and France, but 
other concepts of other nations can be equally valid and relevant. In this respect it has to be 
emphasised that the European Convention – with the participation of representatives of 28 
nations and of the main EU institutions – was so far the best forum to discuss and harmonise 
those concepts at the EU level. Even though the member states adopted the Constitutional 
                                                 
1
 Schäuble–Lahmers (1994)  
2
 Fischer (2000)  
3
 Jacques Delors is cited by Ricard-Nihoul (2012) p. 2.  
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Treaty with only minor changes made to the Convention’s draft, finally it did not pass in two 
referenda in 2005. Instead, we now have the Lisbon Treaty (namely the Treaty on the European 
Union, TEU, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU).  
The Lisbon Treaty actually preserved the initial sui generis nature of the EU where different 
policy areas are being governed with different intensity/methods at the EU level. In fact, most 
of the policies were grouped into exclusive, shared or complementary competences which can 
be carried out via the so-called Community method, while some areas that did not fit into these 
categories are being managed either via coordination (economic and employment policies) or 
via intergovernmental decision-making (foreign affairs, security and defence policy). The 
Lisbon Treaty did not bring substantial deepening about, and it also preserved the existing 
institutional structure with several innovations however (e.g. permanent President of the 
European Council, High Representative-Vice President, ordinary legislative procedure as a rule, 
reforms in the size of the Commission and the voting mechanism in the Council).  
While – along the lines of the Constitutional Treaty – the Lisbon Treaty did not (want to) 
create a federal Europe, it reinforced its federative nature to some extent (e.g. the “bicameral” 
system thanks to the ordinary legislative procedure, or the position of the “foreign minister”). 
On the other hand, it continues to guarantee the Treaty-based framework for differentiation 
(Art. 20 of TEU on enhanced cooperation) while it also introduced the possibility of 
repatriation of competences (Art. 48 of TEU on ordinary revision procedure) as well as that of 
leaving the Union (Art. 50 of TEU) – features not typical for federations. Despite the lack of a 
fully fledged federal structure, the Constitutional Treaty failed in two referenda and the Lisbon 
Treaty in one – pointing to alarming legitimacy challenges. This fact combined with growing 
Euroscepticism must be an important lesson for those who would like to push for “more 
Europe” in terms of both competences and institutional restructuring, even if in the name of 
more transparency, democracy and efficiency.  
Hardly did the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, the most serious financial and economic crisis 
ever hit the European Union. The crisis is still with us and it actually has two parallel impacts 
on European integration: a centripetal one (pushing for deeper cooperation in some key areas 
than ever before) and a centrifugal one (UK’s reservations about membership, growing 
Euroscepticism among EU citizens and the rise of Eurosceptic parties). The reason is simple: as 
mentioned, since the Maastricht Treaty, but more intensively since the crisis, the EU 
increasingly behaves like a state while it still suffers from legitimacy gaps. Thus, even if the EU 
is not and will never become a state, due to its mounting functions – recently including the 
politically so sensitive area of national fiscal policies – it has to close the legitimacy gap. As 
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this tension is being felt for a long time by analysts (e.g. Hix, 2008, Sarduski, 2013) and 
recently also by EU leaders, the issue of a more democratic political union is being discussed 
more intensely than ever before. The debate is once again about the future structures and 
governance of the Union which should also be able to respond to both the centripetal and the 
centrifugal pressures. A further challenge is to have such a system which would enable fast and 
efficient decision-making within and not outside the Treaty-based mechanisms. And last but not 
least – as Figure 1 warns – the confidence of the EU citizens in the Union must also be regained 
as fast as possible.  
 
Figure 1 
In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 79, Spring 2013, First results, p. 10. 
THE PAST FEW YEARS IN TERMS OF GOVERNANCE 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, the EU has been using mixed methods and instruments to tackle 
it and there has been a boom of new institutions, legislation and financial tools 
proposed/created. Here the centripetal and centrifugal forces became visible. On the one hand, 
all the member states were united in some initiatives to tackle the crisis and work together (e.g. 
European Semester, Europe 2020 Strategy, Six-pack, Two-pack), on the other hand, there were 
initiatives not supported by all members (Euro Plus Pact, Fiscal Compact) and again others not 
involving everybody (e.g. European Stability Mechanism Treaty, Single Surveillance 
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Mechanism). Table 1 shows the main building blocks of the EU’s response to the crisis in terms 
of governance. It also shows the great variety of instruments and implementation methods used.  
Table 1 
Main measures taken by the EU since 2010 to tackle the crisis 
 
Name of measure 
or new institution 
Legal basis Aim Method of implementation 
Europe 2020 Strategy 
 
European Council 
Conclusions 
(no Treaty-
provision) 
Gradual compliance with the five 
headline targets across the EU in 
terms of average levels 
 
Coordination: EU-level 
benchmarking, national target 
setting and implementation (27 
MS) 
European Semester  
Art. 121 and 148 of 
TFEU 
Strict coordination of national 
economic and fiscal policies 
according to a fixed calendar 
Coordination at EU level, weak 
role of EP (27 MS) 
Six-pack   
Two-pack 
 
Art. 121, 126, 136 
of TFEU 
Ensuring public finance stability via 
a complex set of preventive and 
corrective rules concerning both 
public budgets and debts 
 
Community method with specific 
features (incl. use of scoreboard, 
reversed QMV* on sanctions) 
(27MS, but sanctions only for 
17MS) 
Treaty on the Stability, 
Coordination and 
Governance of EMU 
(TSCG or Fiscal 
Compact)  
TSCG – a new 
intergovernmental 
treaty (with aim to 
become part of EU 
law) 
Balanced budget rule: structural 
budgets to have a 0.5% deficit 
(guaranteed by a national legal 
basis) if not: CJ** decision, 
sanctions; 
Public debts: reduction benchmark 
Semi-intergovernmental 
cooperation involving several EU 
institutions and binding rules (25 
MS) 
Euro Plus Pact  
 
Euro Plus Pact 
a new 
intergovernmental 
agreement 
Stronger coordination of labour 
market, pensions, health care, social 
security and direct taxation policies 
Intergovernmental cooperation 
involving 
euro area + other member states 
(23MS) 
European Financial 
Stability 
Mechanism/Facility 
(EFSM, EFSF) 
Art. 122.2. of 
TFEU 
Temporary mechanisms for 
financial assistance with total 
lending capacity of  €500 bn., 
collecting money via bonds, lending 
to EU members 
Semi-intergovernmental decision-
making 
EFSM: 27 MS 
EFSF: 17 MS 
European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM)  
ESM Treaty and 
amended Art. 136 
of TFEU 
Permanent mechanism replacing the 
EFSM and EFSF with a lending 
capacity of €500 bn., financing 
primarily of governments and banks 
in euro area 
Semi-intergovernmental with 
Commission, ECB and CJ** 
involved, but no role of EP 
(17MS) 
European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB), 
EBA, ESMA, 
EIOPA*** 
Art. 114 of TFEU 
Macro-prudential and micro-
prudential supervision of financial 
services across the EU to prevent 
malfunctions 
Monitoring, supervision, 
recommendations (27 MS) 
Single Surveillance 
Mechanism (SSM) 
and 
Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) 
(in the pipeline)  
Art. 127.6. of 
TFEU 
To have a “strict and impartial 
supervisory oversight, thus 
contributing to breaking the link 
between sovereigns and banks and 
diminishing the probability of future 
systemic banking crisis”4 
Bank supervision and control (in 
17+ MS) by ECB, direct 
recapitalisation of banks by ESM 
(in euro area) 
Source: own compilation based on European Commission, DG ECFIN website  
*QMV: qualified majority voting in the Council, ** CJ: Court of Justice, ***European Banking Authority, 
European Securities and Markets Authority, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority  
Note: Croatia, as the 28
th
 member state, is joining the relevant institutions and agreements 
 
                                                 
4
 Van Rompuy–Barroso–Juncker–Draghi (2012) p. 5. 
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As it can be seen, those measures are completing the incomplete edifice of EMU set by 
Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact, and they also represent substantial guarantees to 
prevent from similar (primarily financial and fiscal) crises in the future. There is however an 
obvious mixture of the Community method and the so-called Union method – promoted by the 
leaders of Germany and France – in terms of both preparation of proposals (see the rivalry 
between the European Commission and the Van Rompuy Task Force) and the end result.
5
 This 
mixed approach and the patchwork nature of the above mentioned measures and instruments is 
however very detrimental to transparency and accountability. It also makes the whole 
machinery of economic and fiscal policy governance extremely complex and bureaucratic.
6
 Of 
course, the constant dialogue between especially the euro area member governments and the 
EU institutions can in the long run lead to enhanced stability of EMU, but transparency, 
legitimacy and accountability still remain an issue in the coming years. All the more that there 
are no clear lines between national policy discretion and the depth of European Commission 
influence on the highly sensitive budgetary strategies of member states; which can result in 
conflicts and spark a more vivid debate on national sovereignty.
7
 
SCENARIOS TO BE EXPECTED BASED ON RECENT TRENDS AND 
PROPOSED REFORMS  
Since autumn 2012, at least two important speeches and two key documents must be mentioned 
when scrutinising the ideas and initiatives on future European structures and governance. In a 
chronological order the first one was the speech on the state of the Union by Commission 
President Barroso in September 2012.
8
 In this speech Mr. Barroso urged for an upgraded 
economic integration (based on the single market), for a stronger economic and monetary union 
                                                 
5
 Highlighted among others by Chang (2013)  
6
 It is enough to mention the Annual Growth Surveys, the National Reform Programmes, the 
Stability/Convergence Programmes, the County-Specific Recommendations, the Alert Mechanism Reports, the In-
Depth Reviews, etc. 
7
 Recently in an interview Jacques Delors criticised the European Commission for asking the French government 
in its Country Specific Recommendation to reform the notary system: an issue out of EU competence and 
irrelevant in fighting the crisis. As he put it: “The high officials (of the Commission) should not come too often to 
give lessons to the governments.” Reconstruire la grande Europe, Tribune, 19/06/2013, p. 5. http://www.notre-
europe.eu/media/reconstruiregrandeeurope-delors-ne-ijd-juin13.pdf?pdf=ok 
Another example is the dispute between Hungary and the European Commission on recent lowering of retail gas 
and electricity prices for end-users, which is a core element of the current government’s programme heavily 
criticised by the European executive.  
8
 José Manuel Barroso: State of the Union 2012 Address http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-
596_en.htm  
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and finally for a political union. In his view, while most aspects of the first two dimensions can 
be done in the present Treaty framework, for the indispensible political union there is a need to 
create the European federation of nation states. This however – as he underscored – should not 
mean a superstate. It should rather be: “A democratic federation of nation states that can tackle 
our common problems, through the sharing of sovereignty in a way that each country and each 
citizen are better equipped to control their own destiny. This is about the Union with the 
Member States, not against the Member States. In the age of globalisation pooled sovereignty 
means more power, not less.” To build the federation of nation states Barroso pleaded for a new 
Treaty – i.e. not an amended Lisbon Treaty but a new one. He emphasised that we have to be 
careful about this, and that such a process has to be well prepared.  
In fact, in this respect a key prerequisite would be a German-French accord but – despite 
championing for “more Europe” – so far neither of the two parties seems to favour explicitly a 
European Federation of Nation States. On the German side it is important to highlight the legal 
difficulties. In 2009, the German Constitutional Court has ruled that the Lisbon Treaty should 
be seen as the upper limit of European integration, and further deepening would not be 
compatible with the German Basic Law. For a deeper integration, let alone a European 
Federation, Germany would need a new constitution which can be problematic.
9
 Moreover, in 
her speech in Bruges in 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated the Union method 
(instead of the Community or the federal approach).
10
 On the French side there are also 
reservations vis-à-vis the federal concept. France under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been 
supportive of German ideas on reinforcing cooperation at the European level to fight the crisis. 
Beyond strengthened economic and fiscal policies and a “banking union” President Hollande 
would also be in favour of more Europe in terms of solidarity, employment and social policy, a 
bigger common budget, stronger defence cooperation, etc. – but certainly not in the form of a 
European federation. He would rather support a differentiated Europe based on a kind of 
variable geometry involving different willing and able countries into different policy areas. In 
his view, greater democracy in the EU should be ensured via the strong role of the European 
Parliament.
11
  
The other important speech was given by British Prime Minister David Cameron in January 
2013.
12
 In this speech Mr. Cameron highlighted the need to reform the EU, namely by making 
                                                 
9
 http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg09-072en.html  
10
 http://www.bruessel.diplo.de/contentblob/2959854/Daten 
11
 Video of François Hollande’s speech (in French) before the EP on 5 February 2013: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6vsOoAALRY 
12
 Video of David Cameron’s speech: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Ls60Wbq_dk  
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it more flexible, more adaptable, more accountable while also less bureaucratic and able to 
make decisions faster. In his view, the repatriation of certain competences to national levels 
should be feasible as “we cannot harmonise everything”. Since there is no European demos, the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU should be strengthened via the national parliaments. With a 
view to achieving such changes Mr. Cameron would prefer to have a new Treaty. In his view, 
the UK would fit well into such a flexible and cooperative EU that can also provide the 
necessary framework for differentiation. But in any case, the British citizens will be asked 
about staying in or leaving the EU (which would take place before the end of 2017, in case of 
an electoral victory of the Conservative Party in 2015).  
There were also two key proposals put forward towards the end of 2012; one by the 
European Commission
13
 and the other one by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy.
14
 Taking an ambitious stance, both papers called for substantial further deepening in 
the direction of financial, budgetary and economic integration accompanied by more political 
accountability. A highly important common element in both papers is the contractual 
arrangement to be concluded between euro area member states and EU institutions about longer 
term structural reforms, and “in exchange” a certain financial support (Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument) would be available to back those reforms in the given member 
states.
15
 The financial background of this would actually be a new budget, parallel to the 
existing one. In terms of political union implying more democracy and accountability, the Van 
Rompuy proposal suggests to accompany “further integration of policy-making and a greater 
pooling of competences at the European level” with a “commensurate involvement of the 
European Parliament in the integrated frameworks for a genuine EMU.”16 The paper adds the 
importance of fostering cooperation between national parliaments and the EP – without 
specifying its mechanisms. The Commission proposal goes much more into details. Among 
others it also foresees a stronger role of the EP in the whole process of fiscal and economic 
policy coordination. Furthermore, it proposes that members of the Commission take part in 
debates of national parliaments about the Country Specific Recommendations, on their request. 
By looking more thoroughly into the draft, it becomes obvious that a potential split between 
euro area ins and outs within the Commission, the Council and the EP is unfolding.  
                                                                                                                                                           
Full text: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/jan/23/david-cameron-eu-speech-referendum  
13
 European Commission (2012)  
14
 Van Rompuy–Barroso–Juncker–Draghi (2012) 
15
 A comprehensive critical comparison and analysis of these two instruments can be read in Vanden Bosch (2013)  
16
 European Commission (2012) p. 16.  
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Based on the above mentioned ideas and proposals, and also based on current realities and 
citizens’ attitudes, we can broadly project the following scenarios for governance developments 
in the near future.  
Table 2 
Possible scenarios for future EU structures proposed by the author 
 
 
Name of 
scenario 
 
Content of scenario 
Treaty 
change or 
new Treaty 
needed 
 
Strength of scenario 
 
Weakness of scenario 
European 
federation of 
nation states 
Federation would be accepted 
as a method of EU governance, 
revised institutional set up, 
clearer delimitation of 
competences, subsidiarity 
 
Yes 
More transparent and 
efficient decision-
making, better 
representation of the EU 
in the world 
No European demos;  
different national 
interpretations; 
federation would be 
incomplete without a 
genuine fiscal federalism 
Two-tier EU 
The two-tier model for the 
euro area would be further 
institutionalised within the EU 
institutions and also within the 
financing system 
 
Yes 
More efficient 
functioning of EMU 
within the Union with 
stricter rules and greater 
chances for fiscal 
stability 
Fragmented EU, 
institutional and 
budgetary dividing lines 
between ins and outs, 
detrimental to EU 
integrity and image to the 
outside world 
Streamlined and 
flexible EU 
Rearrangement of 
competences (in some areas 
more, in others less), 
differentiation, more 
subsidiarity 
 
Yes 
Reconciliation of 
centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, less 
bureaucracy, could lead 
to a more viable 
integration 
Difficult to find 
consensus on the 
restructuring of 
competences, could lead 
to the erosion of 
integration 
Preserved status 
quo  
The current system would be 
preserved with mixed modes 
of governance but converging 
back to the TFEU/TEU 
framework 
 
No 
Greater use of existing 
tools and mechanisms, no 
split among member 
states over the future EU 
structures 
Lack of transparency, 
issues of legitimacy and 
accountability would still 
be pending 
 
SOME RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE HIGH-LEVEL POLICY-MAKERS        
OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES 
It seems to be quite a challenge to formulate recommendations to the Visegrad (V4) countries 
on EU strategy as, apart from some shared positions (e.g. in the field of cohesion policy 
financing, energy supply issues, enlargement and Eastern Partnership
17
) these countries have 
different attitudes and also occupy different positions in the Union. Poland aspires to become an 
important medium-sized power in the EU, while the Czech Republic has been more 
                                                 
17
 See more on this topic in Vida (2012)  
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eurosceptic, and Hungary recently more critical. Unlike Slovakia, these three countries are not 
in the euro area, and as regards the EU’s crisis management measures the Czech Republic and 
Hungary did not adhere to all of them, as it can be seen in Table 3 below (while adherence to 
the Single Surveillance and Single Resolution Mechanisms will be optional by non-eurozone 
countries).  
Table 3 
Membership in crisis management instruments by the V4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the non-homogenous status of the Visegrad countries vis-à-vis those key institutions 
and instruments, I attempt to draw up some proposals that could serve as a basis for V4 
cooperation in shaping the future of European integration. A common denominator could be the 
recognition of the EU’s already mentioned legitimacy gap and the necessity to do something 
about it. In my view, to close this gap the EU should make efforts in two dimensions in the near 
future: it should try to strengthen both its input and output legitimacy.
18
 When considering the 
future structures and functioning of the EU and formulating the position of the V4 countries on 
it, these two dimensions should serve as a compass for them.  
On the one hand, there is a need to reinforce the input legitimacy of the Union by 
strengthening its democratic aspects. In concrete terms it would primarily mean to foster the 
emergence of a European demos. This could be done, among others, via the creation of a 
genuine European media supplying EU news and offering platforms for debates without taboos 
and double standards in all EU languages; as well as via “Europeanizing” the EP-elections 
through formulating/communicating common European electoral programmes by the 
representatives of the different political groups across the Union; and in close connection to 
this, via establishing a clearer link between EP elections and the would-be president of the 
European Commission. Furthermore, the more intensive involvement of national parliaments 
                                                 
18
 The concept – widely used in EU studies – was introduced by Fritz Scharpf. Its importance was recently 
emphasised among others by Schmidt (2013) or Karaman (2013).  
Name of instrument Membership by V4 
Europe 2020 Strategy V4 
European Semester V4 
Six-pack, Two-pack V4 
TSCG HU, PL, SK 
Euro Plus Pact PL, SK 
ESM V4 
ESRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA V4 
SSM, SRM SK+ 
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into European affairs, or the more frequent use of the European Citizens’ Initiative would also 
belong to the appropriate tools to bring the EU closer to its citizens in terms of input legitimacy.  
On the other hand, it would be equally important to reinforce the output legitimacy of the 
Union. This would primarily mean a reinforced use of subsidiarity – advocated recently also by 
Commission President Barroso
19
 – via which the EU should focus on policy areas which really 
matter for citizens
20
 and/or where it can really be more efficient and effective compared to the 
national, regional or local levels by bringing about an obvious added value (e.g. strict 
surveillance of the financial sector, establishing trans-European infrastructure networks, 
deepening energy policy, fighting climate change, promoting student exchange programmes, 
etc).
21
  
Regarding the unsuccessful/problematic ratification processes of the recent past (Nice 
Treaty, Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) and also keeping citizens’ scepticism in mind 
(coupled with an ever lowering participation in European Parliament elections
22
), it could 
probably be a good strategy for the V4 countries to push for more input and output legitimacy 
before any Treaty change is put on the agenda. The V4 group, together with other allies could 
perhaps draw up concrete proposals in both dimensions, first in the framework of the current 
primary law. Any Treaty change – or eventually a new Treaty – could then be supported with a 
view to reinforcing those initiatives which seem to bring about a tangible improvement of the 
EU’s performance. In case the Union’s input and output legitimacy is not reinforced in the near 
future, a deeper Euroscepticism can be expected among EU citizens. Therefore, when reshaping 
the European Union to enhance its legitimacy, voices from Eurosceptic or simply more critical 
countries/parties should also be heard and the V4 leaders as well as EU leaders should be more 
open-minded towards their arguments too.   
To sum up, the following aspects might serve as a basis for elaborating future 
recommendations to the leaders of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, in case 
this group would be determined to shape the upcoming developments of European integration.  
                                                 
19
 José Manuel Barroso: State of the Union 2013 Address http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
684_en.htm   
20
 Among others Simon Hix (Hix, 2008) draws attention to the fact that, based on Eurobarometer surveys, there is 
often a discrepancy between what the EU is doing at the supranational level (e.g. agricultural policy, trade 
liberalisation) and what really matters for its citizens (e.g. immigration, education, health care, taxation).  
21
 On every day level a positive example would be the lowering of the prices of mobile phone conversations across 
the Union, while a negative one would be the failed proposal on how to serve olive oil in restaurants. In a more 
general dimension, of course a more successful crisis management in Greece would have strengthened the EU’s 
output legitimacy while its failure magnifies the lack of it.  
22
 Turnout at EP elections has been steadily declining from nearly 62% in 1979 to 43% in 2009.  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/000cdcd9d4/Turnout-%281979-2009%29.html  
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 To stand against ad hoc intergovernmental solutions in tackling the crisis and to be careful 
about the so-called Union method;  
 To stick to the Lisbon Treaty framework and to the integrity of the institutions and the 
acquis;  
 To work for increased input and output legitimacy first within the Treaty framework and to 
elaborate joint proposals thereof; 
 To build up a dialogue with those who are more sceptical/critical;  
 To support any Treaty change only  
o after some improvements of input and output legitimacy are tangible 
o if it does not lead to an institutionalised two-tier model; 
 To discuss and harmonise interests/strategies vis-à-vis the potential scenarios of future EU 
structures; 
 To play a catalyst role in these approaches by creating a wider alliance network.  
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